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Living with Lawrence
Nan D. Huntert
The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas' is easy
to read, but difficult to pin down. Much like the opinion of the
Court in Romer v. Evans, also written by Justice Kennedy,
Lawrence is powerful and important and will have a profound
impact on the law and especially on the lives of lesbian and gay
Americans. Exactly what it means for state regulation of sexu-
ality beyond the elimination of sodomy laws, however, is less
clear; it is heavier on rhetoric than on clarity.
The primary reason that the Lawrence opinion is so diffi-
cult to grasp is also one of its strengths as a coherent cultural
document: it weaves together substantive due process and
equal protection doctrine into a holistic analysis of the cultural
weight of the individual rights involved. Liberty and equality
are the two chords of the opinion. While its holding is unambi-
guously about the scope of liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause, the explication of the right to liberty is layered with
culturally resonant invocations of the dignity due to the group
of people-lesbians and gay men-who exercise that right in a
particular way. In the story that the opinion tells, one senses
that the "why" behind the decision is explained not only by the
"what" of the action, but also by the "who" of the dramatis per-
sonae.
How to sort out this mixture-and how lower courts will
decode what is essential and what is dicta in the opinion-will
drive the federal law of substantive due process and equal pro-
tection for many years. But the opinion is too rich to rest one's
t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful for the com-
ments by my fellow participants in the Minnesota Law Review Symposium, as
well as for feedback by those who heard presentations at American University
Law School, the Association of American Law Schools Conference, and Wil-
liam and Mary Law School. Thanks for research assistance to Robin Fuku-
yama and Emily Kern and for a summer research stipend to the Brooklyn Law
School.
1. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
2. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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interpretation with law alone. At a deeper level, we can analyze
the opinion's location in political and cultural discourse, to
identify what work this opinion performs in the ongoing inter-
action among the state, civil society, and the culture's notions
of sexuality.
This Article will proceed in three steps. First, I will exam-
ine the Court's treatment of liberty. I see Lawrence as marking
the emergence of a new approach to substantive due process
analysis, one that has been simmering in the concurring opin-
ions of Justices Souter, Stevens, and Kennedy for the last dec-
ade. These three Justices apparently now have a majority for
extending meaningful constitutional protection to liberty inter-
ests without denominating them as fundamental rights. They
also appear to be jettisoning, at least prospectively, a special
category for privacy rights. Second, I will turn my attention to
the ramifications of Lawrence's equality subtext. The only
equal protection opinion per se is the concurring opinion of Jus-
tice O'Connor, which is significant for its elaboration and clari-
fication of the heightened rational-basis review standard the
Court used in Romer v. Evans. Justice O'Connor's opinion ex-
plicitly adopts a new form of rational-basis review triggered by
indicia of animus toward the group being subjected to adverse
treatment. Third, I aspire to read between all its lines and un-
ravel the larger meanings of the liberty-equality dialogue em-
bedded in the decision. In my view, the Lawrence opinion is in
perfect tune with its times, articulating a new principle of
equal liberty and resonating with a neoliberal political vision of
civil rights.
I. DECONSTRUCTING LIBERTY
"Liberty" is the Court's major chord. Lawrence begins with
"liberty" and ends with "freedom,"3 and those word choices are
not a fluke. The opening paragraph defines Lawrence as a case
about realms where government should not go. The first four
sentences of the opinion declare:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is
not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives
and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a
dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.4
3. 123 S. Ct. at 2475, 2484.
4. Id. at 2475.
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Later, the opinion returns to the same theme: The peti-
tioners'
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right
to engage in their [sexual) conduct without intervention of the gov-
ernment. "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter." The Texas
statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its in-
trusion into the personal and private life of the individual.'
Thus, one plausible reading of Lawrence is that it is sim-
ply, forthrightly anti-statist. One powerful, but partial, way to
understand Lawrence is as a libertarian anthem.6 In my view,
however, a better understanding of this opinion sees the con-
vergence of various strands of a new approach to substantive
due process, not yet a full-blown theory, but one which gels in
this opinion more fully than it has before. How the Court an-
swers two core questions-what is the scope of the right at is-
sue, and is that right fundamental-both reveal the new ap-
proach.
A. WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THIS LIBERTY RIGHT?
Lawrence is seemingly the culmination of a line of cases-
Griswold v. Connecticut,7 Eisenstadt v. Baird,' and Roe v.
Wade 9-that collectively have become known as forming the
core of a right of privacy recognized under the rubric of sub-
stantive due process. The Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hard-
wick' ° described them as "the privacy cases from Griswold to
Carey."" One would expect, then, that the Lawrence opinion
would be easy to categorize as a privacy case. The fact that
there is any question about this elementary aspect of it indi-
cates the elusiveness of reaching a confident interpretation.
5. Id. at 2484 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847
(1992)).
6. Randy Barnett makes the fullest argument to this effect. See Randy E.
Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas (Boston
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper Series, Public Law & Legal Theory, Work-
ing Paper No. 03-13, July 16, 2003), http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/
BarnettR071603aabstract.html. For an extended response to Professor Bar-
nett's arguments, see Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1140, 1142-48 (2004).
7. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003).
11. Id. at 191.
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There are many references to "private" sexual conduct in
the decision, but nowhere does the Court describe the right at
issue here as "privacy." The only use of the word "privacy" in
the majority opinion, outside of a quotation, is where the Court
acknowledges that Griswold used that word to describe the
relevant liberty interest.12 Perhaps the Court, while sounding
like it is writing to praise privacy, has secretly come to bury it,
by shifting in a subtle way back to the underlying concept of
liberty, which-unlike privacy-has an unambiguous mooring
in constitutional text.
It is difficult to know how much to make of this absence, or
whether "privacy" as such will reappear in future decisions.
Perhaps the nonuse of a particular word is merely fortuitous, or
perhaps it is a byproduct of the proclivities of the author,
rather than a signal of any broader shift. It would certainly be
ironic if Lawrence marked the end of a right of privacy in for-
mal constitutional taxonomy. Moreover, the word has achieved
such widespread popular usage and appeal that it may be im-
possible for the Court to put this cat back into the constitu-
tional bag, even if the majority wanted to.
Still, something seems to be afoot. Note that in the course
of reversing Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court resuscitates not the
classic defense of privacy in Justice Blackmun's dissent, but the
liberty analysis of Justice Stevens.13 Although both dissents in
Hardwick," like the concurring opinion in Lawrence," reject
majoritarian moralism as a sufficient basis for criminal prohi-
bition, 16 there are differences between the one chosen and the
one not chosen that may signal a move away from one juris-
prudential approach and toward another.
The Blackmun dissent in Hardwick responds to the man-
date that "we must analyze... Hardwick's claim in the light of
the values that underlie the constitutional right to privacy.
" 1
7
Although the dissent touches on many aspects of that right, two
themes dominate, which are reflected in Blackmun's descrip-
tion of Hardwick's claim as centering on "his privacy and his
12. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477.
13. See id. at 2484.
14. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199-220 (Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
15. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16. See id. at 2487; see also Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199-220 (Blackmun, J.,
and Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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right of intimate association." 8 The first theme frames the pri-
vacy line of cases as about matters that constitute identity or
personhood: "[T]he issue raised by this case touches the heart
of what makes individuals what they are."19 The second theme
stresses the associational freedom necessary for such identity
formation: "The fact that individuals define themselves in a sig-
nificant way through their intimate sexual relationships with
others ....,,0
Justice Blackmun's dissent alternates between a universal-
ist concept of privacy and an identity-based concept. The uni-
versalist theme is certainly there: he begins by rejecting the
majority's framing of the case as about homosexual sodomy
rather than about "'the right to be let alone,' 21 and argues in-
stead that "what the Court really has refused to recognize is
the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the
nature of their intimate associations with others."" Despite his
protestations, however, implicit in the logic of the Blackmun
dissent is the acceptance of the majority's frame. When he ar-
gues that the law touches on acts that are central to identity
and self-definition, he, too, is using homosexuality as his refer-
ence point. It seems unlikely that Blackmun would have argued
that sexual conduct was self-definitional if the case had been
about heterosexual conduct.
Justice Stevens's dissent in Hardwick, by contrast, invokes
many of the same universalist themes as the Blackmun dissent
but conceptualizes them in a somewhat different way. The pri-
mary logic of his dissent operates in three steps. Sodomy can-
not be prohibited for married persons under Griswold,22 nor for
unmarried persons (apparently presumed to be heterosexual)
under Eisenstadt.24 Thus, because the state cannot impose bur-
dens unequally without good reason, sodomy cannot be prohib-
ited for homosexuals either. 5
To reach this conclusion, Stevens deploys the same idea of
autonomy that Blackmun used, but claiming the full liberty
18. Id. at 201.
19. Id. at 211.
20. Id. at 205.
21. Id. at 199 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
22. Id. at 206.
23. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 216.
25. Id. at 218.
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clause as its foundation. Stevens explicitly rejects a privacy
paradigm, which he characterizes narrowly as "'the individual's
interest in protection from unwarranted public attention, com-
ment or exploitation.' 21 Instead, he reads the Griswold-
Eisenstadt-Carey line as "actually... animated by an even
more fundamental concern[:] ... 'the individual's right to make
certain unusually important decisions that will affect his own
or his family's, destiny.',27 This is Stevens's explanation for
"[tihe essential 'liberty' that animated the development of the
law in cases like Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey.""
Stevens's extolling of liberty sounds almost like a repeti-
tion of Justice Blackmun's language about self-definition and
autonomy, with the semantic substitution of "liberty" for "pri-
vacy." I believe that it is conceptually different, however, in
ways that foreshadow the opinion in Lawrence. Justice Ste-
vens's opinion weaves together privacy and equality themes in
a more seamless way than Blackmun's opinion does. Stevens's
central move is to extend the Eisenstadt logic 9 one step further,
implicitly invoking the famous Brennan formulation of privacy
plus equal protection: "If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion. .. 0 In this way,
Justice Stevens makes equal treatment under the law the logi-
cal fulcrum of his dissent; it is the critical insertion of the equal
protection point which extends the liberty (privacy) right to Mi-
chael Hardwick. At the same time, Stevens's dissent eschews
an interpretation of either liberty or equality that is contingent
on Hardwick's identity. The same quality of interwoven doc-
trine is the hallmark of Lawrence.2 '
Justice Stevens's foreswearing of privacy talk in Hardwick
not only foreshadowed Lawrence, but marked the beginning of
a split in the pro-choice wing of the Court into a "liberty"
branch and a "privacy" branch. The joint opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Planned Parenthood v. Ca-32
sey reads very much like Lawrence if one is engaged in a hunt
26. Id. at 217 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716,
719 (7th Cir. 1975)).
27. Id. (quoting Fitzgerald, 523 F.2d at 719-20).
28. Id. at 218.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 47-48.
30. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
31. See infra Part III.A.
32. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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for "privacy." References to "privacy" are as rare in the joint
opinion as they are in Lawrence. Instead, multiple references to
"liberty" underlie the Court's conclusion that a "woman's right
to terminate her pregnancy before viability is... a componentof ,,33
of liberty we cannot renounce. By comparison, Justice
Blackmun's opinion is almost poignant in its repeated use of
"privacy," as if he could resuscitate the Griswold-Roe formula-
tion by simply declaring that the majority was using it.
34
Whether the right is denominated as "liberty" or "privacy,"
the logic of Lawrence will reverberate in future substantive due
process cases touching on marriage and morality. As to the
former, one ramification is clear: Lawrence eliminates the last
vestiges of marriage as the only zone of permissible expression
for any and all forms of sexual practices. For that reason, the
liberty analysis in Lawrence has major ramifications for the
law of marriage-not for gay marriage, as public reaction to the
decision would suggest, but for that other kind. 5
Historically, marriage determined the lawfulness of sexual
conduct. Sexual acts might be unlawful outside of marriage for
wildly variant reasons-if they resulted from force or if they
were categorized as per se immoral, for example-but the same
acts of intercourse were shielded within marriage.3 6 Both par-
ties in Lawrence framed the case clearly around this aspect of
marriage. At oral argument, the first sentences spoken by each
of the opposing counsel revealed that the question of the free-
dom to engage in sexual conduct undefined by marriage was
central to their claims.3' The attorney for the Petitioners began
33. Id. at 871.
34. Id. at 926-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
35. Any significant impact on the right of same-sex couples to marry will
flow from equality analysis. See infra Part II.C.
36. The same Model Penal Code proposal adopted in 1962 that incorpo-
rated a decriminalization of sodomy also retained the exemption for marital
rape. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND
THE LAw 1278 (2d ed. 2004). Despite some court decisions striking down such
exemptions and much refinement of them by state legislatures, approximately
half of the states still maintain some different elements for proving rape com-
mitted by a spouse than for any other rape. See id. at 1283-86. Although the
Georgia sodomy statute at issue in Hardwick made no exception for married
persons, the state's attorney conceded the point at oral argument that it would
be unconstitutional as applied to a married couple. Oral Argument of Michael
E. Hobbs, on Behalf of the Petitioner, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(No. 85-140), at 1986 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 74, at *6.
37. Oral Argument of Paul M. Smith, on Behalf of the Petitioners, and
Oral Argument of Charles A. Rosenthal, Jr., on Behalf of the Respondent,
2004] 1109
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his argument by asserting that Texas "claims the right to
criminally punish any unmarried adult couple" for certain
forms of sexual conduct.38 The attorney for Texas began his re-
sponse by arguing that the sodomy law was constitutional "be-
cause this Court has never recognized a fundamental right to
engage in extramarital sexual conduct.
"
,
9
As part of the delinking of sex and marriage, the Court's
opinion in Lawrence readjusted the interpretation of the earlier
cases. Griswold, Eisenstadt, Carey, and Roe became known in
retrospect as cases about procreation and procreative decision
making, about "the decision whether to bear or beget a child,"4°
not about sexual conduct. In Lawrence, the Court modified the
meaning of those cases to focus more on sexual conduct, an-
other move anticipated in Justice Stevens's opinion in Hard-
wick, where he used less euphemistic language than Justice
Blackmun did about the matter before the Court, referring not
only to life-shaping decisions but also to "the intimacies of
[married persons'] physical relationship."4'
Although the Court in Lawrence treats its discussion of the
early cases as merely descriptive, it subtly regrounds those
cases with a greater acknowledgment that what had been be-
fore the Court was sexual activity, not simply decisions about
whether to become a parent. The Court wrote that in Griswold,
"[tihe Court described the protected interest as a right to pri-
vacy and placed emphasis on the marriage relation and the
protected space of the marital bedroom. After Griswold, it was
established that the right to make certain decisions regarding
sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship." 2 Con-
sider the shift reflected in those terms from the Court's descrip-
tion of the same two cases eleven years earlier: "In Griswold,
we held that the Constitution does not permit a State to forbid
a married couple to use contraceptives. That same freedom was
later guaranteed ... for unmarried couples. See Eisenstadt v.
Baird."3 Both descriptions are correct, but they are different.
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102), at 2003 WL 1702534,
at *3, *26.
38. Id. at *3.
39. Id. at *26.
40. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
41. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by Law-
rence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472.
42. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
43. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
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The Court's somewhat franker description in Lawrence is a
closer fit to what Griswold actually said. Griswold contains
many euphemistic references to sexual conduct, many more
than its allusions to the decision to parent." Accordingly, Jus-
tice Goldberg noted that "it may shock some of my Brethren
that the Court today holds that the Constitution protects the
right of marital privacy."' The statute at issue did not prohibit
spouses from having sex, but its practical import, by barring
the use of contraceptives, was to force couples to limit the fre-
quency of sexual intercourse. Analyzing Griswold, Professor
Harry H. Wellington wrote that "the state has undertaken to
sponsor one institution that has at its core the love-sex rela-
tionship. That relationship demands liberty in the practice of
the sexual act." 6 Under the law, marriage was not so much lim-
ited to procreation, as procreation and, by necessary implica-
tion, sex, were limited to marriage.
The moment in Eisenstadt when the text turns from the
privacy right established in Griswold to the factual situation
before the Court-unmarried couples seeking to remove the
risk of procreation from intercourse-is precisely the moment
when the Equal Protection Clause is invoked to supersede due
process questions. The point of juncture is the "[ilf the right of
privacy means anything" language.47 This invocation provided
an escape hatch from the Court's having to rule that a right to
"marital relations" extended also to the unmarried. Moreover,
the culmination of the phrase in "the decision whether to bear
or beget a child"4" provided the platform from which the Court
could, in the following year, extend the procreative decision-
making right to encompass abortion.49 That one sentence in
44. For example: the "intimate relation of husband and wife," Griswold,
381 U.S. at 482; "the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms," id. at 485; "'it is
difficult to imagine what is more private or more intimate than a husband and
wife's marital relations,"' id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); "the intimacy of
husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the insti-
tution of marriage,'" id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe, 367
U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting)); "the intimacies of the marriage relation-
ship," id. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
46. Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 292 (1973).
47. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
48. Id.
49. Although the decisions were issued in two different terms, the cases
were before the Court simultaneously. Eisenstadt was argued on November 17
2004] 1111
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Justice Brennan's opinion, serving so many crucial purposes,
must surely rank as one of the most brilliant political moves in
the Court's history.
In Lawrence, the Court tied up the loose ends of this pro-
ject. By invoking and enacting the multidimensional texts of
Griswold and Eisenstadt, the Court made explicit that "the
right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct ex-
tends beyond the marital relationship." ° Its definitive
delinking of sex and marriage makes clear that no form of sex
between consenting adults can be prohibited on the ground that
they are not married (with the possible exception of when one
or both are married to someone else). Lawrence re moves the
last obstacle to the paradigm of consent, rather than the insti-
tution of matrimony, controlling the definition of when sex is
presumptively legal.
Lurking beneath the sex-and-marriage question is the is-
sue of morality. Where the Court in Eisenstadt had sidestepped
the question of whether morality was a permissible state inter-
est, in Lawrence the Court adopted Justice Stevens's Hardwick
formulation: "'the fact that the governing majority in a State
has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not
a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the prac-
tice."'51
By finding that morality alone cannot justify a prohibition,
the Court did not seal the fate of all the various statutes
thought of as morals laws. Rather, a state must now demon-
strate some other rationale for such laws, presumably some
form of objectively harmful effects. Fornication laws are clearly
now impermissible, although criminal laws against adultery
may not be; one could argue about whether their efficacy in
protecting marriage or preventing emotional harm is more than
an illusion. Prostitution laws will probably not be struck down,
since the Court seems to have accepted that commercialization
of sexual conduct creates harmful secondary effects. 52 Most in-
and 18, 1971. 405 U.S. at 438. Roe was first argued less than a month later, on
December 13, 1971. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973). Roe was held over
for reargument during the following term. Id.
50. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2477 (2003).
51. Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
52. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (upholding
city ordinance banning public nudity; finding that the city's interest in pre-
venting harmful secondary effects associated with adult entertainment estab-
lishments was not related to the suppression of the exotic message conveyed
1112 [Vol 88:1103
LIVING WITH LAWRENCE
cest laws will remain in place, although in a few situations of
relations between adults without close blood ties, they may be
in jeopardy.53
In sum, the Lawrence opinion extends the scope of liberty
under the Due Process Clause to encompass the individual's
agency rights to make decisions about which avenues of sexual
expression to pursue, at least in private between two adults not
married to someone else. State assertions that the law could
nonetheless prohibit that conduct-if it were commercial, for
example-will require demonstration of rationales other than
moral disapproval. But by withholding the label of privacy from
this right, the Court sent its first signal that it reached this re-
sult by a different path than most observers expected.
B. Is THIS LIBERTY INTEREST A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE?
The second signal came in the Court's answer to a question
closely tied to the question of scope: Is this right fundamental?
The Court in Lawrence strikes down the Texas law without
characterizing its test for doing so, after concluding that
Americans have a liberty interest in private sexual conduct and
that Texas has no sound basis for criminalizing such conduct.
Justice Scalia is correct to observe there is no fundamental
right denominated as such.54 The Court imposes no duty on the
state to demonstrate a compelling interest in sustaining its
law; rather, it finds that "[t]he Texas statute furthers no le-
gitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual."55
One cannot simply conclude that the Lawrence test is one
of rational basis. The rational-basis test, however, as we have
known it, will almost never lead to the invalidation of a state
law. "[A] classification neither involving fundamental rights
nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong pre-
sumption of validity.""
by nude dancing).
53. Margaret M. Mahoney, A Legal Definition of the Stepfamily: The Ex-
ample of Incest Regulation, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 21 (1993); Christine McNiece
Metteer, Some Incest Is Harmless Incest: Determining the Fundamental Right
to Marry of Adults Related by Affinity Without Resorting to State Incest Statut-
es, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 262 (2000).
54. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 2484.
56. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993).
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Nor does the Court analyze the Texas sodomy law in the
deferential manner that it uses when only a rational basis is
required. Not all liberty is equal; the Court said in Washington
v. Glucksberg that "the Due Process Clause specially pro-
tects... fundamental rights and liberties."57 The recognition of
a liberty interest not categorized as fundamental leads only to a
balancing of the individual's interests and the government's,
not to any presumption against the statute in question. 8 More-
over, the Court has recognized that the state can abridge even
"significant liberty interest[s]" by showing a legitimate, not
necessarily compelling, need to do so.&9
Using a rational-basis test, if that is what it is, makes the
Court's conclusion in Lawrence even more powerful in certain
respects-the interests proffered by Texas are found to be not
even rational, much less compelling. It also lowers the stakes
for describing the individual's right; the Court's text makes
clear that it is somehow a core right, but never crosses the line
into denominating it as fundamental, with the attendant con-
sequence of heightened scrutiny. At the same time, however,
using a rational-basis test makes a strong decision potentially
easier to distinguish in future cases-the Court can always re-
turn to an approach that gives much greater deference to state
laws, as the typical rational-basis test does, without stepping
outside of precedent. °
Although the Court does not label the right of the parties
in Lawrence as fundamental, the analogic reasoning in its hold-
ing relies on a series of cases in which the Court did recognize a
fundamental right: Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey. The
Court in Lawrence relies for its holding primarily on the protec-
tion established in those cases for choice, control of one's "des-
tiny,"6' and the principle of "autonomy."62 The individual's right
of "choice" and to "choose" -words used three times in five sen-
tences63-connects Lawrence to the Griswold-to-Casey line of
57. 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (emphasis added).
58. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
59. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
60. The first appellate courts to interpret Lawrence used rational-basis
review in just this way. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs.,
358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004); State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App.
2004); Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
61. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2477 (2003).
62. Id. at 2481.
63. Id. at 2478.
The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether
1114 [Vol 88:1103
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cases. If the liberty interest recognized by Lawrence implicates
the full range of autonomy decisions, as it seems to, then it
must surely be fundamental. But if the Court really intends it
to be fundamental, why didn't they say so? If this isn't merely a
game, what is going on?
One aspect of the Court's approach in Lawrence is that it
looked primarily at the legitimacy of the government's action.
Alongside its recognition of the destiny interests of the indi-
viduals involved, the decision focuses on the action of the state,
as well as on the conduct of the persons subject to prosecution.
Similar to the way that the Court in Romer v. Evans focused
more on the classification than on the characteristics of the
group being classified,64 the Lawrence opinion frames the cen-
tral question as "whether the majority may use the power of
the State to enforce [ethical and moral] views on the whole so-
ciety through operation of the criminal law."65
Such an approach could be read simply as libertarian. On a
libertarian theory taken to its fullest conclusion, government
cannot step into intimate zones of life, absent demonstrated
harm to others, regardless of whether the conduct in question
comprises a fundamental right.6 Brushing your teeth cannot be
the target of detailed codes of governmental regulation as to
how the brushing can and cannot be done. To successfully chal-
lenge such a law, one should not have to argue that brushing
or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the
State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its
boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the
law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose
to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and
their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.
When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with an-
other person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution al-
lows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.
Id. (emphasis added).
64. Janet Halley concluded that "if the same discrimination were inflicted
on blondes or burglars, the same conclusion would follow." Janet E. Halley,
Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 429, 441 (1997); see also Nan D.
Hunter, Proportional Equality: Readings of Romer, 89 KY. L.J. 885, 889-90
(2001).
65. 123 S. Ct. at 2480.
66. This argument was presented to the Court in Lawrence by the amicus
brief of the Institute of Justice. Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Cu-
riae in Support of Petitioners at 12-13, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003) (No. 02-102), available at 2003 WL 164140.
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your teeth is a component of bodily integrity or that a particu-
lar method of brushing is central to one's personhood.
The Lawrence opinion may resemble that approach, but its
logic remains embedded in a substantive due process frame-
work. The Court held that by enacting its sodomy law, the state
was acting out of bounds, a conclusion buttressed by the fact
that its actions impeded decisions implicating some of the
deepest concerns of autonomy and destiny. Because govern-
ment crossed the line of impermissible action, a line drawn in
part by the understanding that private sexual conduct is a zone
of decision making entitled to respect, the exact nature of the
right being traversed-i.e., fundamental and entitled to "spe-
cial" protection, or not-was a question that the Court did not
have to reach.
Not having to reach that question signals the emergence of
a different approach to substantive due process claims. In prior
decisions on challenges to sodomy laws, courts have asked first
whether the right claimed was fundamental; based on the an-
swer to that question, the next inquiry was whether the state's
interest was compelling or whether it had a rational basis. The
state had to demonstrate that its law served some harm-
reduction goal only if the individual right was classified as fun-
damental; otherwise, an interest in promoting morality was
found to be sufficient. Both courts that have upheld,67 and
courts that have struck down,68 sodomy laws have used that de-
cisional model.
In Lawrence, the approach was different. The Court found
that the state's intrusion into private sexual life was impermis-
sible absent a showing by the state that it was justified by more
than the desire to promote certain concepts of morality. The
Court's conspicuous failure to use any of the terms that we
have come to expect in sodomy cases--"fundamental right" or
"compelling state interest," for example, in addition to "pri-
vacy"-tells us that the Court found the applicability of those
terms to be irrelevant. By asking the question of whether the
governmental action had a legitimate basis first, and conclud-
ing that it did not, the Court did not need to then ask whether
the individual was seeking to exercise a fundamental right,
67. See, e.g., Missouri v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)
(upholding statute prohibiting deviate sexual intercourse between persons of
the same sex).
68. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350 (Ark. 2002) (holding
that sodomy statute infringed on fundamental right of privacy).
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such that the state's action would have had to satisfy a compel-
ling interest test.
The Lawrence decision's structure-of finding that Texas
had breached the negative liberty limits on state power in a
context where basic autonomy rights were at issue-does not
resolve the question of whether the rights involved are "funda-
mental." But the Court's reasoning renders that absence
largely a matter of only technical import. The Court drew
analogies that connected decisions about private sexual inti-
macy not only to the Griswold line of cases, but also, even more
profoundly, to an individual's "freedom of thought, belief [and]
expression."69
What is significant for future interpretation is that the
Court characterized the sexual rights at issue in Lawrence as
equivalent to those previously established as fundamental. On
this point, Casey provides the best explanatory text for Law-
rence. In Casey, as in Lawrence, the Court did not use funda-
mental rights or strict scrutiny language per se,'7 0 but it did
nonetheless continue to protect the right to choose abortion by
drawing on the logic of the contraception cases and Roe v. Wade
and by analogizing between abortion and contraception. 71 Simi-
larly, the Court in Lawrence, by quoting Casey as to the deeper
meanings of liberty for an individual's personal destiny, 2 said
in effect that choices about private intimate behavior are "in
some critical respects ... of the same character"7 3 as the deci-
sions that lay behind the desire to use contraception or to ob-
tain an abortion. In both Casey and Lawrence, the Court es-
chewed direct use of fundamental rights language, but made
clear that the rights being compared were equivalent and
therefore entitled, by whatever standard of review, to equiva-
lent protection.
C. THE SHIFT TO ARBITRARINESS REVIEW
If in fact Lawrence marks the beginning of a substantive
due process jurisprudence that examines negative liberty limits
on state power before, or instead of, articulating a specific
standard of review, where did this come from? And where are
69. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
70. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992).
71. Id. at 852-53.
72. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481-82 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
73. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
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we headed? This inquiry will lead us back to the year of the
first repeal of a sodomy law74 and Justice Harlan's dissent in
Poe v. Ullman.75
Justices Kennedy, Stevens, and Souter are moving the
Court to a more flexible analytical structure for evaluating sub-
stantive due process claims. Just as the Court has essentially
frozen the kinds of classifications that it will subject to height-
ened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, 6 the current
Court appears to be beginning the project of holding sub-
stantive due process rights subject to strict scrutiny at the
status quo. At the same time, it is developing a new mode of
analysis to deploy for some substantive due process claims.
Lawrence marks the first time that a majority of the Court
has articulated this new approach, but not its first appear-
ance. 77 Greater elasticity in substantive due process analysis
had its origins in the abortion cases. There, the Court has not
retrenched from most of the effect of Roe v. Wade, which held
that a woman's right to choose to have an abortion falls within
the right of privacy and is fundamental; "only personal rights
that can be deemed 'fundamental'... are included in this guar-
antee of personal privacy."78 But it has altered the terms of
analysis. In Casey, the Court declared that Roe v. Wade would
not be overruled,79 and the Court did not explicitly find that the
woman's right was less than fundamental. However, in addi-
tion to implicitly repudiating "privacy," the Court also substi-
tuted "undue burden" for "strict scrutiny" as the standard of
review to be used in assessing restrictions on abortion. ° The
74. See infra note 111.
75. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. The Court articulated its rationale for utilizing heightened scrutiny in
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-42 (1985).
The Court in that case declined to apply heightened scrutiny to classifications
based on mental disability. Id. The Court has not identified a new classifica-
tion requiring such scrutiny since then.
77. Justice Kennedy also used a similar approach for an equal protection
analysis of Colorado's Amendment 2, which barred that state's anti-
discrimination statutes from including sexual orientation, in Romer v. Evans.
In Romer, the Court invalidated an amendment to the Colorado state constitu-
tion which barred adoption or enforcement of antidiscrimination provisions
protecting homosexuals, absent further amendment of the constitution, saying
that it "fail[ed], indeed defie[d], even [the rational basis standard]." 517 U.S.
620, 632 (1996).
78. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
79. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
80. Id. at 875-78.
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Court downshifted into a more lenient standard of review even
as it preserved Roe v. Wade.
Staking out a liberty interest as a fundamental right was
once a mechanism for insuring it greater protection against
state intrusion, as in the privacy cases until Casey. More re-
cently, however, the conservative wing of the Court has fought
to enshrine the category of fundamental rights as a contain-
ment device. In Glucksberg, where the Court upheld state bans
on physician-assisted suicide against a challenge asserting a
liberty interest on the part of all terminally ill patients, Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote that the limitations on finding any as-
serted right to be fundamental operated as a way to "rein in"
judicial activism in substantive due process analysis.8 '
Rehnquist defined as fundamental, rights "'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition,'" and so essential to 'the
concept of ordered liberty'. .. that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed.' 82 This use of history and
tradition drew on and modified the proposed definition ad-
vanced by Justice Scalia, who, in an earlier plurality opinion,
sought to limit the category of fundamental rights to those in-
terests that have a "tradition" of being protected.83
Under the Glucksberg approach, fundamental rights con-
stituted a frozen category and a limiting principle that operated
to bar any meaningful protection for interests that could not
meet its eligibility criteria.8' At several points during oral ar-
gument in Lawrence, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia sought to
redirect the questioning to force exploration of the due process
issues into the Glucksberg frame." The resistance by other Jus-
81. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
82. Id. at 721 (citations omitted).
83. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989).
84. "[Tlhe majority opinion [in Glucksberg] offered an analysis of funda-
mental rights that suggested that there would be few such announcements in
the future." John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehqquist
Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 568 (2002). As
McGinnis correctly argues, the right to abortion could not have met the
Glucksberg test, had it been in effect at the time of Roe v. Wade. Id. at 569.
85. Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed Petitioners' attorney, Paul M.
Smith: "[I] think our case is like Glucksberg, say, if you're talking about a
right that is going to be sustained, it has to have been recognized for a long
time. And that simply isn't so." Oral Argument of Paul M. Smith, on Behalf of
the Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102), at
2003 WL 1702534, at *4. Justice Scalia also addressed Petitioners' attorney:
"Really what's at issue in this case is whether we're going to adhere
to... what we said in... Glucksberg, mainly that before we find a substan-
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tices to its limitations did not coalesce into a viable alternative
theory of due process until the Court's opinion in Lawrence,
which shows the first signs of the emergence of a new majority.
Before Lawrence, there had been a series of skirmishes
about the tightness and exclusivity of the fundamental rights
approach. In Troxel v. Granville,86 for example, Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion for the Court analyzed the right of
parents to control with whom their children had visitation as
fundamental, based on the long line of cases protecting a par-
ent's interest in controlling the upbringing of children, 7 but
found the law unconstitutional without applying strict scru-
tiny." Both the concurring opinion of Justice Souter89 and the
dissent of Justice Kennedy9° avoided either describing the right
as fundamental or applying strict scrutiny. All three of these
opinions drew a rebuke from Justice Thomas, who accused
them of not applying strict scrutiny for incursions on a funda-
mental right; "curiously, none of them articulates the appropri-
ate standard of review. "91 In Chicago v. Morales,92 in which the
Court ruled that a Chicago ordinance prohibiting loitering by
members of street gangs was unconstitutionally vague, Justice
Stevens noted in his plurality opinion for the Court that "lib-
erty interests" could be identified that were not necessarily
fundamental.93 This also drew responses from Justices Scalia 94
and Thomas,95 who countered that no "right to loiter" could pos-
sibly pass the Glucksberg history and tradition test, given the
long existence of antiloitering laws, and therefore, there could
be no substantive due process protection for this activity. The
dispute was tangential, however, because the Court's holding
turned on other grounds.96
tive due process right, a fundamental liberty, we have to assure ourselves that
that liberty was objectively deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion." Id. at *8-9. Justice Scalia's dissent also stresses that the majority erred
by not following the Glucksberg analysis. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2491-92
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
87. Id. at 65-66.
88. Id. at 72-73.
89. Id. at 75-77 (Souter, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 95-96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
92. 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (plurality opinion).
93. Id. at 53 n.19.
94. Id. at 84-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 102-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The fullest explication of an alternative position, now
largely adopted through Lawrence, came in Justice Souter's
concurring opinion in Glucksberg. Justice Souter drew exten-
sively from Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman97 and
formulated a standard of whether the statute "sets up one of
those 'arbitrary impositions' or 'purposeless restraints' at odds
with the Due Process Clause."98 Justice Souter's method for an-
swering that question recognized that "the kind and degree of
justification that a sensitive judge would demand of a State
would depend on the importance of the interest being asserted
by the individual."99 As he explained:
[T]he business of such review is not the identification of extratextual
absolutes but scrutiny of a legislative resolution (perhaps uncon-
scious) of clashing principles, each quite possibly worthy in and of it-
self, but each to be weighed within the history of our values as a peo-
ple . . . Thus informed, judicial review still has no warrant to
substitute one reasonable resolution of the contending positions for
another, but authority to supplant the balance already struck be-
tween the contenders only when it falls outside the realm of the rea-
sonable." °
None of the other concurring opinions in Glucksberg formu-
lated an alternative method of substantive due process analy-
sis. Justice O'Connor wrote that because the statutes at issue
there did not block a terminal patient experiencing great pain
from obtaining medications that would hasten death, the Court
did not have the occasion to consider whether such an individ-
ual had a constitutionally protected right to control the circum-
stances of death. ' Justice Ginsburg stated only her substantial
agreement with Justice O'Connor's approach. 10 2 Justice Breyer
suggested that the person described by Justice O'Connor might
have a fundamental right, tying that to Justice Harlan's dis-
sent in Poe, as explicated by Justice Souter.103 Justice Stevens
wrote that some applications of the statutes at issue in Glucks-
berg might be unconstitutional, reminding the Court that its
opinion in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health' had
found a protected liberty interest in a terminally ill patient's
97. 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
98. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752 (1997) (Souter, J., con-
curring) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
99. Id. at 762.
100. Id. at 764.
101. Id. at 736-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 736.
103. Id. at 790-91 (Breyer, J., concurring).
104. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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right to refuse treatment."°5 The Glucksberg cacophany illus-
trated the fractured and uncertain nature of the opposition on
the Court to the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas approach to sub-
stantive due process analysis.
The Lawrence opinion marks a new majority for Harlan's
arbitrariness review, in substance if not in name. Justice Ken-
nedy (who had joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Glucksberg) extended substantive due process protection with-
out declaring that the right at issue was fundamental, although
the opinion details at great length the ambiguity surrounding
the legal history associated with sodomy laws. The logic of the
analysis in Lawrence largely tracks that of Justice Souter's
concurring opinion in Glucksberg, combining the inquiry into
whether the government's justification was reasonable with
consideration of the nature and the weight of the individual in-
terests asserted. The most direct and explicit adoption of prior
analysis, of course, came from Justice Stevens's dissent in
Hardwick.0 6 There, the majority had relied heavily on tradition
and superficial understandings of history; in response, Stevens
articulated a non-strict-scrutiny skepticism of government in-
trusion in certain zones of life. Although he did not cite Harlan
or elaborate on method, the Stevens dissent in Hardwick was
thoroughly consistent with Harlan's dissent in Poe.'°7
The new majority on the Court has reinvigorated the pro-
tection of liberty enabled by substantive due process analysis.
However, it is also still struggling to formulate a more coherent
articulation of the difference between drawing boundaries for
105. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 742-45 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
106. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 214-20 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
107. Justice Harlan famously described liberty as "a rational continuum
which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary im-
positions and purposeless restraints, and which also recognizes, what a rea-
sonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particu-
larly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment."
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). Justice Stevens in Hardwick described:
the American heritage of freedom-the abiding interest in individual
liberty that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen's right to de-
cide how he will live his own life intolerable. Guided by history, our
tradition of respect for the dignity of individual choice in matters of
conscience and the restraints implicit in the federal system, federal
judges have accepted the responsibility for recognition and protection
of these rights in appropriate cases.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Por-
ter Mem'l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975)).
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the legislative branch and second guessing it. In a sense, the
majority has engaged in a strategic retreat, specifically to the
ground of Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe, the strongest point
from which to defend substantive due process. If my analysis is
correct, the current line of privacy cases will remain essentially
undisturbed. However, the Court's future forays into substan-
tive due process interpretation will not follow the path of pri-
vacy jurisprudence that the Griswold court began, but will de-
part from Poe anew on a nearby but different trajectory.
II. DECONSTRUCTING EQUALITY
In some respects, recognition of the individual liberty of
adults to engage in consensual sexual acts in private seems
merely the long overdue culmination of principles that the
Model Penal Code..8 and The Wolfenden Report,0 9 both docu-
ments from the 1950s, drew from John Stuart Mill.' ° The Court
has settled a very old and narrow debate about consensual ho-
mosexual conduct between adults in private; the same outcome
could have occurred during the Eisenhower or Kennedy eras."'
And while this description might accurately summarize the
Court's liberty holding, it would not capture the full import of
the case, because it would ignore the opinion's powerful minor
chord of equality.
The civil-rights-style rhetoric that enriches the opinion
suggests that this is liberty with a new inflection, where the
desire to erect a buffer against government may be the pri-
mary, but is not the sole, driving force. Certainly it sounds
nothing like the language of those 1950s texts, which assumed
108. The American Law Institute project to draft a model criminal law be-
gan in the 1950s. Tentative drafts of the proposed Model Penal Code, which
decriminalized consensual sodomy between adults, began circulating in 1955.
PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN
THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 136-37 (2000). The final pro-
posal was adopted by the ALI in 1962. Id. at 137.
109. COMMITrEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, THE
WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES
AND PROSTITUTION (authorized American ed., Stein & Day 1963) (Her Maj-
esty's Stationary Office, London 1957) [hereinafter WOLFENDEN REPORT].
110. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75-94 (Alburey Castell ed., F.S.
Crofts & Co. 1947) (1859).
111. Illinois took the first step to decriminalization in the United States in
1961, when it adopted the recommendation for decriminalization contained in
what were then still drafts of the Model Penal Code. CAIN, supra note 108, at
137. New York changed sodomy from a felony to a misdemeanor in 1965. Id.
Connecticut became the second state to decriminalize sodomy in 1969. Id.
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that homosexuality was repugnant and sought only to argue
that criminal law was not the best method for deterring it. 1 2 In
Lawrence, we have a Court opposed to the existence of sodomy
laws because they "demean[]" gay people and create "stigma"
for a group that deserves "respect" for the "choices" made in
their "private lives." 3
The Court also spoke in major and minor chords in Hard-
wick, but in a way that used references to the conduct and the
class to create a discursive double bind. In Hardwick, the Court
used a rhetorical structure of condemning certain conduct be-
cause gay people engaged in it and condemning gay people be-
cause they engaged in such conduct. Or, as Janet Halley de-
112. "[Hlomosexuality rank[s] high in the kingdom of evils." Karl Men-
ninger, Introduction to WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 109, at 5. The text of
the Wolfenden Report contains numerous examples of language indicating the
repugnancy of homosexuality: "It is almost impossible to compare the inci-
dence of homosexual behavior with the incidence of other forms of sexual ir-
regularity, most of which are outside the purview of the criminal law and are
therefore not recorded in criminal statistics. .. ." WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra
note 109, § 46, at 41.
We have had no reasons shown to us which would lead us to believe
that homosexual behavior between males inflicts any greater damage
on family life than adultery, fornication or lesbian behavior. These
practices are all reprehensible from the point of view of harm to the
family, but it is difficult to see why on this ground male homosexual
behavior alone among them should be a criminal offense. This argu-
ment is not to be taken as saying that society should condone or ap-
prove male homosexual behavior. But where adultery, fornication and
lesbian behavior are not criminal offenses there seems to us to be no
valid ground, on the basis of damage to the family, for so regarding
homosexual behavior between men.
Id. § 55, at 44-45.
It seems to us that the law itself probably makes little difference to
the amount of homosexual behavior which actually occurs; whatever
the law may be there will always be strong social forces opposed to
homosexual behavior. It is highly improbable that the man to whom
homosexual behavior is repugnant would find it any less repugnant
because the law permitted it in certain circumstances ....
Id. § 58, at 47.
Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting through
the agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin,
there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which
is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business. To say this is not
to condone or encourage private immorality. On the contrary, to em-
phasize the personal and private nature of moral or immoral conduct
is to emphasize the personal and private responsibility of the individ-
ual for his own actions, and that is a responsibility which a mature
agent can properly be expected to carry for himself without the threat
of punishment from the law.
Id. § 61, at 48.
113. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480-82 (2003).
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scribed the reasoning, criminalization of acts committed by
homosexuals required no strict scrutiny because they (i.e.,
those acts committed by those people) fell outside the bounds of
traditional concepts of liberty, and thus criminalization could
be justified by the state's presumptively rational determination
of the immorality of homosexual identity.
114
In Lawrence, the double bind itself is flipped, and the two
voices reinforce tolerance rather than condemnation. "Equality
of treatment and ... due process right[s] ... are linked in im-
portant respects, and a decision on the latter point advances
both interests. ... [The sodomy law] in and of itself is an invi-
tation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in
the public and in the private spheres.""5
A. A REVERSAL OF MORE THAN LAW
One reason for the intensity of the Lawrence opinion is
that the Court does more than reverse Hardwick. Reversals by
the Court are highly atypical, but hardly unheard of. In Law-
rence, however, the Court reconstructs not only the law but also
the social meaning of homosexuality.
Even radical changes in law are sometimes accompanied
by bland language. Some of the most important reversals of
constitutional understandings have been bloodless, at least on
the page. In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, "6 for example, the
Court overturned a century's worth of reliance on the principle
that federal courts could reason toward a shared national
common law by issuing binding interpretations of the common
law of the states. Its significance was not widely known, how-
ever; it received public attention only after Justice Stone wrote
to Arthur Krock of the New York Times that it was "the most
important opinion since I have been on the court."
117
When the Court has reversed itself in areas of important
political and social conflict, authors of such turning-point opin-
ions have been more likely than in other cases to mobilize elo-
quence to justify the about-face. Still, although many of those
texts have been stirring, even in cases touching on contentious
social questions, decisions have usually been cast in fairly im-
114. Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and
After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993).
115. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
116. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
117. Irving Younger, What Happened in Erie, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1011, 1029
(1978).
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personal terms. In West Virginia v. Barnette"18 and in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,19 the Court reversed prior diametri-
cally opposite holdings announced less than fifteen years ear-
lier. In both, the Court used eloquent invocations of grand prin-
ciples to justify the new results, but the text centered on
abstractions, rather than on giving voice to the schoolchildren
or women laborers whose interests were before the Court.
The reversal of both precedent and social direction that
comes closest in tone to Lawrence is Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion. 20 Its text contains a more personal voice in one famous
passage: "To separate [children] ... solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone."'2' Similar language in Lawrence
addresses the issue of stigma: "When homosexual conduct is
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and
of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to dis-
crimination both in the public and in the private spheres."2 2
Even compared to Brown, however, Lawrence is rhetori-
cally more powerful. In Lawrence, the Court holds that the rea-
soning in Hardwick was not just incorrect, but irrational. The
Court dissects the Hardwick opinion at length, seemingly with
the goal not just of discarding it, but eradicating it. Chief Jus-
tice Warren's opinion for the Court in Brown did not carry the
rhetorical burden of having to overcome simultaneously dis-
senting voices from within, so perhaps one factor at work was
that Justice Kennedy had to work harder to muster a com-
manding tone. Whatever the reason, when one reads Law-
rence's demolition of Hardwick alongside the Court's rejection
of Adkins v. Children's Hospital23 in West Coast Hotel v. Par-
rish ,24 or of Minersville School District v. Gobitis2 ' in West Vir-
118. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down a board of education requirement
that all students and teachers participate in the flag salute).
119. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage law for
women).
120. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
121. Id. at 494.
122. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003).
123. 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S 379 (1937).
124. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
The legislature "is free to recognize degrees of harm and it may con-
fine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed
to be clearest." If "the law presumably hits the evil where it is most
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121ginia Board of Education v. Barnette, or of Plessy v. Fergu-
127 121
son in Brown, the contrast is stunning. One senses that this
Court was removing a stain as well as a precedent.
Moreover, the Lawrence opinion sounds as if the Court is
describing an entirely different group of people than the group
felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to
which it might have been applied." There is no "doctrinaire require-
ment" that the legislation should be couched in all embracing terms.
This familiar principle has repeatedly been applied to legislation
which singles out women, and particular classes of women, in the ex-
ercise of the State's protective power. Their relative need in the pres-
ence of the evil, no less than the existence of the evil itself, is a matter
for the legislative judgment.
Our conclusion is that the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospi-
tal ... should be, and it is, overruled.
Id. at 400 (citations omitted).
125. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
126. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Lastly, and this is the very heart of the Gobitis opinion, it reasons
that "National unity is the basis of national security," that the au-
thorities have "the right to select appropriate means for its attain-
ment," and hence reaches the conclusion that such compulsory meas-
ures toward "national unity" are constitutional. Upon the verity of
this assumption depends our answer in this case.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citi-
zens to confess by word or act their faith therein....
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their
power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the
purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from
all official control.
The decision of this Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis
and the holdings of those few per curiam decisions which preceded
and foreshadowed it are overruled, and the judgment enjoining en-
forcement of the West Virginia Regulation is Affirmed.
Id. at 640, 642 (citation omitted).
127. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S 483
(1954).
128. Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
"Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
[retard] the educational and mental development of Negro children
and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial[ly] integrated school system."
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by
modem authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this
finding is rejected.
Id. at 494-95 (quoting lower court opinion) (alterations in original).
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with which it was concerned in Hardwick. The language carries
a stronger personal valence than in other jurisprudentially
comparable opinions, employing a voice that seems to defend
the people as well as the principle before the Court. In addition
to the stigma passage, the Court in Lawrence speaks in an em-
pathic register when it describes the two gay men before it as
"two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other,
engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.
The State cannot demean their existence or control their des-
tiny .. ,129
This tone makes the tenor of the opinion more of an index
of social change than the holding. Consider the example of the
current military policy on exclusion of openly lesbian and gay
service members. Lawrence makes no new outcome inevitable
in challenges to that policy, but it does presumptively invali-
date (or at a minimum, cast strong doubt on the constitutional-
ity of) the prohibition against sodomy in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, which covers both same-sex and opposite-sex
acts.130 To the extent that the exclusionary policy is based on a
propensity to commit the crime of sodomy, it will be weakened
by decriminalization.
The primary rationale for Don't Ask, Don't Tell, though, is
unit cohesion and morale, i.e., the asserted harm to morale that
would result from the known presence of lesbian or gay
troops. 1' Even this justification, however, is weakened by re-
moval of the imprimatur for antigay stigma provided by sod-
omy law. Lawrence renders antigay animus more culturally iso-
lated and more obviously irrational. More by logic than by law,
it has strengthened the argument that the courts can properly
insist that the military abide by constitutional norms and
eliminate policies based on irrational prejudice.
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR: "[To BE TREATED IN THE SAME MANNER
AS EVERYONE ELSE"
1 32
Although the majority opinion's equality rhetoric is ex-
traordinary, for any substantive analysis of equal protection
one must turn to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion.
129. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
130. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2000).
131. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(14) (2000).
132. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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O'Connor's opinion in Lawrence marks the first time in her two
decades as a Supreme Court Justice that she has written any
decision-majority, dissent, or concurrence-in a gay rights
case. From Justice Scalia's point of view, her endorsement of
rational basis with bite in the field of equal protection review
must have added insult to the injury of Justice Kennedy's ma-
jority opinion, which used what seemed like rational basis on
steroids for analyzing a substantive due process claim.
O'Connor's concurring opinion repeats the proportionality
principle of Romer v. Evans. The law cannot target a group of
persons for a broad range of disfavored treatment based on a
single characteristic bearing little or no relationship to the par-
ticular policies at issue.1 1 3 O'Connor's opinion notes the multi-
farious collateral consequences of the Texas sodomy law and
declares that the law cannot single out one group for "under-
class" status based on its members having engaged in conduct
which is not illegal when others engage in it. 
134
She also takes the Romer opinion one logical step further,
by finding that "[m]oral disapproval of a group cannot be a le-
gitimate governmental interest."1 35 In Romer, Colorado (which
had long ago repealed its sodomy law) did not claim morality as
a state interest in support of Amendment 2, so the Court had
no occasion to declare whether morality could comprise a
proper basis for such a law. 136 Here, Texas did claim morality,
and only morality, as the interest behind its sodomy law. 137 It
seemed clear even at the time of Romer-and is obvious now-
that the six-Justice majority in that case would have found mo-
rality alone an insufficient basis for legislation. So O'Connor's
reasoning is not a surprise, but it does provide an explicit com-
pletion of the logic of the Romer analysis.
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Lawrence men-
tions morality only in passing, to say that however genuinely
held, moral beliefs cannot provide the basis for police actions by
the state.1 38 That leaves O'Connor's opinion as the only one
from the Court's majority that actually takes up the morality
question as such. As a result, Scalia's arguments about moral-
133. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See generally Hunter, supra note
64 (discussing Romer v. Evans).
134. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 2486.
136. See 517 U.S. at 635.
137. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 2483-84.
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ity (as opposed to his points about stare decisis, for example)
emerge more sharply in response to O'Connor than to the ma-
jority.139 The upshot of this pairing is that the morality debate
in Lawrence is framed as much more about a group of persons,
the context for O'Connor's equal protection analysis, than about
a form of conduct.
Ironically, such was also the case in Hardwick,4 ° even
though the Georgia statute should have called forth an analysis
based on conduct rather than class, since it prohibited sodomy
by both opposite- and same-sex couples.' In Lawrence, by con-
trast, the majority used a more universalist liberty analysis for
a statute which, unlike the Georgia law, actually did prohibit
only same-sex sodomy. It seems that either way, regardless of
what the statute before the Court actually says or how the ma-
jority frames it, a debate on the morality of homosexuality will
ensue. This was the second round of full-and-open debate on
that point in the Supreme Court.'42 One firm prediction (you
heard it here first): It won't be the last.
Combining the majority opinion with O'Connor's concur-
rence further highlights the shift to more flexible standards for
review. In just this one case, the Court scrambled two tradi-
tional standards of review: the majority striking down a prohi-
bition of sexual conduct without explicitly finding that it in-
fringed a fundamental right, and Justice O'Connor striking
down a classification without finding it to be suspect or merit-
ing heightened scrutiny. In the same week, her opinion for the
Court had upheld the University of Michigan Law School's af-
firmative action policy, even though it did utilize a suspect
classification (race), 1 3 because its remedial purpose justified a
somewhat differential application of strict scrutiny. The neat, if
mechanical, tiers of review in constitutional analysis seem to be
139. Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123
S. Ct. at 2472.
141. See id. at 188 n.1 (noting the text of the Georgia statute).
142. There have been other partial debates. Justice Scalia argued the im-
morality of homosexuality in his dissent in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
644-46 (1996). The majority, however, did not engage the point since Colorado
did not argue it. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, both the majority and dis-
senting opinions sidestepped the issue, concluding that the validity of any one
view of morality was irrelevant to a proper resolution of the issues before it.
530 U.S. 640, 661, 686, 702 (2000). Moral arguments, however, formed a back-
drop to the case.
143. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003).
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collapsing.
Why they are collapsing merits more thought than this Ar-
ticle allows. At least one reason, though, may lie in the fact
that since United States v. Carolene Products Co.,14 the central
justification for countermajoritarian intervention by the courts
to strike down discriminatory laws has been the lack of political
power on the part of the disadvantaged minority. 145 The com-
plexities of political power, oppression, and resistance in con-
temporary U.S. society have now grown too byzantine to sup-
port the rigid rankings that emerged, particularly in equal
protection law. As Suzanne Goldberg has pointed out, Justice
Stevens has long called for an alternative to the rank ordering
of tiers of scrutiny, as Justice Marshall did before him. 1
46
Whether either a single standard or a sliding scale approach
will now start to emerge, and whether it will be workable if it
does, may form an important part of the decisional matrix for
all forms of equal protection questions post-Lawrence and post-
Grutter.
C. APPLICATIONS OF EQUALITY
Equality provides the melody behind the words for the ma-
jority opinion in Lawrence and the theme for Justice O'Connor's
concurrence. But there is one issue of equal treatment that the
majority strenuously avoids: whether lesbians and gay men can
marry on the same terms as all other Americans. Thus, the
court pairs its strangely worded admonition against "abuse of
an institution the law protects" " 7 with recognition that a gay or
lesbian relationship cannot be criminalized, "whether or not [it
is] entitled to formal recognition in the law."48 Justice
O'Connor believes that "preserving the traditional institution of
marriage" is a legitimate state interest and presumably would
satisfy the rational-basis test that would be used to decide a
gay marriage case.1
4 9
Justice Scalia, whose gifts to gay rights advocates can in-
clude over-reading holdings with which he disagrees, declares
144. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
145. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 438,
445-46 (1985).
146. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004).
147. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478 (2003).
148. Id. at 2478 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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that nothing stands between Lawrence and gay marriage,
unless illogical distinctions are drawn.15 ° In particular, he finds
that Justice O'Connor's "preservation" is simply a euphemism
for expressing moral disapproval of homosexuality, which he
reads the majority opinion as having taken out of play in con-
stitutional analysis.15' Justice Scalia also dismisses procreation
as the central purpose of marriage, noting that opposite-sex
couples who cannot procreate are nonetheless entitled to
152
marry.
Here again, as with military policy, the impact of Lawrence
is likely to be more on the logic and tenor of the debate about
homosexuality than on the legal validity of marriage laws. The
right to marry is already a fundamental right as a matter of
substantive due process, and the Court has shown no signs of
protecting it less, whatever it is labeled.153 Lawrence alters nei-
ther the due process aspects of marriage nor the equal protec-
tion standards for classifications based on sexual orientation.
The legal status of gay family bonds-whether between
adults or between parent and child-has already shifted from
one of universal exclusion from the protections of law to one of
segregated systems. Legal inventions such as civil unions, do-
mestic partnerships, and second-parent adoptions provide an
assortment of methods for states to recognize and regulate gay
families while still barring gay couples from exercising the op-
tion to marry.154 Future courts analyzing the marriage issue
will have to confront the question of whether the segregated
systems now proliferating in family law derive from anything
more than moral disapproval of gay people, or, if they do have a
rational basis, whether the classification should be subject to
heightened scrutiny. 55 As states increasingly adopt systems
150. Id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2496.
152. Id. at 2498.
153. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (protecting the
fundamental right of parents to rear their children); see also supra notes 40-
50 and accompanying text.
154. As this Article goes to press, it appears that Massachusetts will be-
come the first jurisdiction in the United States where same-sex couples can
legally marry. In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565
(Mass. 2004); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
For a comprehensive survey of the legal issues, see LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenws eds., 2001).
155. Courts that consider whether to apply heightened scrutiny will have
to assess which equal protection analogy should govern. Segregation based on
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which basically duplicate marriage, the stranger it seems to
preserve segregation qua segregation.
As to other, less dramatic but more numerous kinds of
equality challenges, the Court also gave little in specific predic-
tiveness. It was striking that there was no mention in the ma-
jority decision of the primary method by which sodomy laws
have been used to silence and penalize gay people, which has
been in the context of family and employment law. The Court
noted that sodomy law convictions have far-reaching conse-
quences, using those examples as illustrations of why even a
misdemeanor can be significant.' But sodomy laws have been
most frequently enforced indirectly, not directly, by the denial
of custody or other parental rights to gay parents or by exclu-
sions from certain jobs. 17 The ensuing ruptured families and
lost employment opportunities resulted from the logical connec-
tion between homosexuality and violation of a sodomy law,
even though the litigants had never been convicted of illegal
conduct.
The omission of any reference to this body of case law in
the majority opinion strongly suggests that all five Justices
who joined the opinion were not ready to rule that homosexual-
ity is irrelevant in all those contexts. Cases involving children
appear to raise some of the most difficult issues for courts. Two
questions during oral argument in Lawrence illustrate the
range of views. Justice Ginsburg asked the State's lawyer
whether gay Texans can adopt children. 118 Chief Justice
Rehnquist asked Lawrence's lawyer whether, if he prevailed,
states could prefer heterosexuals to homosexuals to teach kin-
race has been abolished, but various systems remain segregated by gender be-
cause of cultural constructs about the salience and realness of gender differ-
ence. Demands for same-sex marriage call into question whether gender dif-
ference is an essential ingredient of marriage and whether sex-based
distinctions are presumptively unconstitutional because they discriminate
against either women or men as a group, or because they perpetuate different
statuses under the law which are defined by gender.
156. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
157. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (employ-
ment), cert. denied 522 U.S. 1049 (1998); Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d
581, 586-87 (Miss. 1999) (custody); Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 n.5
(Ala. 1998) (custody); Ex parte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998) (visita-
tion). See generally Diana Hassel, The Use of Criminal Sodomy Laws in Civil
Litigation, 79 TEx. L. REV. 813 (2001) (describing how sodomy laws have been
used to disadvantage homosexuals in several areas of law).
158. Oral Argument of Charles A. Rosenthal, Jr., on Behalf of the Respon-
dent, Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472 (No. 02-102), at 2003 WL 1702534, at *35.
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dergarten."9 By contrast to the majority opinion, Justice
O'Connor's opinion did acknowledge the full range of indirect
effects of the sodomy laws, not just from convictions but also
from the mere existence of the laws, which "mak[e] it more dif-
ficult for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as eve-
ryone else."16°
What is likely to happen next is a period during which
courts will choose between either rejecting any relevance of
homosexual orientation out of hand, or tackling specific, case-
by-case fact-finding projects in order to assess what relevance
there may be in each given situation. 1 Either way, lesbian and
gay parents and job seekers will be far more likely to prevail
now than they were prior to Lawrence, especially in states
where there had been sodomy statutes. But such cases will still
need to be litigated.
III. RECONSTRUCTING MEANINGS
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL LIBERTIES
The Court's combination of liberty and equality produces
an opinion that seems more holistic and connected to social ex-
perience and practice than likely would have been the case if
the Court had separated its analyses of substantive due process
and equal protection into distinct segments. The Court recog-
nized the synergy between the two doctrines, but did not at-
tempt to draw broader ramifications from it.162 However, an ap-
preciation of the mutual reinforcement of equality and liberty
principles has been gradually increasing for some time in the
Court's constitutional jurisprudence.
This developing understanding of the interdependence of
liberty and equality also can be traced to the abortion cases.
The Court has maintained its original framing of the right to
159. Oral Argument of Paul M. Smith, on Behalf of the Petitioners, Law-
rence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472 (No. 02-102), at 2003 WL 1702534, at *20.
160. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. Adultery law provides a handy comparison. Courts have debated, for
example, whether firing a law enforcement officer because he engaged in an
adulterous relationship would always be justified because the law prohibited
adultery, or whether it would have to be related to a specific factual context,
such as the impact on the workplace of the fact that his adulterous relation-
ship was with the wife of a fellow officer. See, e.g., Marcum v. McWhorter, 308
F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2002).
162. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
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an abortion as guaranteed by the substantive component of due
process, but has strengthened its language to fortify that right
with an understanding of the ramifications for women of lack-
ing control over pregnancy.'63 The liberty right of procreative
control has thus acquired a strong equality inflection.
In cases where the Court has confronted claims of not-
quite-deprivation of liberty, as experienced by persons in not-
quite-suspect classes, it has in practice displayed a willingness
to take into account a kind of cross-doctrinal cumulative
weighting of the interests involved and the consequences of ad-
verse legal treatment. For example, where a parent whose pa-
rental rights had been terminated sought leave to appeal with-
out paying the cost of having a transcript prepared, the Court
ruled that indigency could not bar an individual from pursuing
an appeal, even though there is no general right to appeal and
the liberty interest involved did not entitle a litigant to the as-
sistance of counsel at public expense.1
64
It is not clear whether the pairing of such claims in a mu-
tually reinforcing way will affect the Court's explicit methodol-
ogy or standard for judicial review. Rebecca Brown has argued
that although the theoretical underpinnings of judicial review
have differed in liberty and equality cases, they should be un-
derstood cohesively to constrain courts from invalidating de-
mocratically enacted laws except in one circumstance: when
representative democracy has malfunctioned, such that differ-
ential burdens are imposed that have the effect of impairing
"important liberties."165 "[B]oth representation-reinforcement
163. In Roe v. Wade, the Court recognized
the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according
to his professional judgment up to the points where important state
interests provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to
those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and
primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest
with the physician.
410 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1973). In later cases, the Court restated the central
holding of Roe in language that gave primary weight to the woman's moral
agency and bodily integrity. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977).
Eventually the Court described the impact that having a right to choose abor-
tion has on the capacity of women to function as equals in the society. See
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992); Thornburgh v. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986).
164. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); see also Julie A. Nice, The
Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizing the
Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209,
1239-48.
165. Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491,
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theory and deliberative democracy theory ... come full circle to
demand the same thing of representative government[:] ...
that majoritarian policymaking bodies offer legitimate reasons
for their laws restricting liberty."'66
In nations where the controlling law has more of a human
rights, and less of a negative liberty, foundation, the melding of
these principles has focused more explicitly on the dignitarian
norms suggested in the language of Lawrence. In his concurring
opinion to the ruling of the South African Constitutional Court
invalidating that nation's sodomy law, Justice Sachs wrote that
"the motif which links and unites equality and privacy... is
dignity."167 "Dignity" is an explicit component of the South Afri-
can Constitution (distinct from equal treatment and privacy),
one which "requires ... acknowledg[ment of] the value and
worth of all individuals as members of our society." 68
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence goes to some length
to acknowledge the value and worth of lesbian and gay Ameri-
cans, beyond traditional liberty language about, for example,
"the right to be let alone."169 His opinion reinvigorates liberty
theory, by its recognition that autonomy is not just an abstract
ideal, but a highly contingent reality, the effectuation of which
depends as much on imbalances of power among citizens as the
imbalance between citizen and government. We may eventually
look back on Lawrence as the moment of inauguration for a
new principle of equal liberty,'7 one which carries potentially
powerful constitutional meanings.
1550 (2002).
166. Id. at 1541.
167. Nat'l Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1999
(1) SA 6, 62 (CC) (Sachs, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 28 (majority opinion). In the South African constitutional
scheme, "[tihe central notion is not that of autonomy, but that of dignity," a
principle of both negative and positive liberty, which South Africans drew
from the Vienna Conference on Human Rights. A.L. Sachs, The Challenges of
Post-Apartheid South Africa, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 63, 65 (2003).
169. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
170. Robert C. Post identifies the same development less as a melding of
equal protection and due process than as an alteration of the latter: "Themes
of respect and stigma are at the moral center of the Lawrence opinion, and
they are entirely new to substantive due process doctrine." Robert C. Post,
Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117
HARV. L. REV. 4, 97 (2003).
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B. POLITICS AND CULTURE
As I read Lawrence, it joins three distinct streams of politi-
cal philosophy and jurisprudence: individualism, antipathy to-
ward the state, and the ideal of equality. Correlatively, where
government does not intrude or impede, liberty as this Court
understands it is not threatened. Certainly nothing in this de-
cision undermines the logic of Harris v. McRae171 or Maher v.
Roe,'7 ' the two decisions which held that the government is not
obligated to include abortion among the services covered by the
Medicaid program.
This combination of moderate libertarianism and individu-
alist equality reproduces norms consistent with both the
American civil rights tradition and with neoliberalism. Neolib-
eralism is a political and cultural paradigm that stresses de-
regulation and greater market freedom more generally: privati-
zation of public functions in order to achieve the assertedly
greater efficiencies of private markets and individual responsi-
bility.173 Unlike more traditional forms of conservative politics,
however, neoliberalism is not allergic to equality.174 Indeed,
there is nothing inconsistent between neoliberalism and civil
rights, at least so long as achievement of civil rights denotes
the end of prejudice and economically irrational discrimination,
and not redistributive policies. A neoliberal civil rights para-
digm produces a system in which liberty rights modeled on con-
tract and property become open to all, and in which the state
has become formally neutral toward the group in question.
Neoliberal civil rights is negative liberty incarnate.
Whatever its shortcomings, for lesbians and gay men, Law-
rence is a breakthrough. It ends our wandering in law's wilder-
ness, uncertain in each case whether we would be treated with
respect or contempt. At bottom, Lawrence made lesbians and
gay men citizens instead of criminals. We are the newly natu-
ralized, even if native-born, Americans. For the gay civil rights
movement, Lawrence is the end of the beginning.
171. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
172. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
173. See Martha T. McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of Effi-
ciency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 115, 118-27 (2000), for an astute
application of the political science literature on neoliberalism, most of it con-
cerning international trade practices, to domestic political issues in the United
States.
174. See LISA DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY? NEOLIBERALISM,
CULTURAL POLITICS, AND THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY xviii-xix (2003).
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Is Lawrence the end of antigay oppression? Of course not.
Also like Brown v. Board of Education, its full implementation
is likely to proceed at less than warp speed. Massive social
structures do not change easily or quickly, especially when the
mandate for change is a work in progress rather than a final
command. What will come next in the broader political and le-
gal culture is difficult to assess. The equality which is possible
in a neoliberal political culture will likely provoke demands for
renorming. In the economic sphere, renorming will not come
easily. One should not expect a neoliberal model of gay civil
rights to include mandates for employers to incur the expenses
of accommodating difference (e.g., extension of insurance bene-
fits to same-sex partners) or for government to move toward de-
privatization of social costs (e.g., universal access to health
care).
Culturally as well as economically, state policies operate in
the context of a baseline. The cultural baseline for the state's
regulation of sexuality is a privileging of heterosexual relations
and the social norms that have grown up around them, and
specifically around marriage. Accepting gay people into that
normative universe requires both a shift in the prevailing norm
so that it is stretched to include homosexuality and residence
by gay people within its new boundaries.
A move into the mainstream inevitably results in a degree
of assimilation, with both gains and losses for the newly
arrived group, as well as for their long-established neighbors.
In this case, one such gain and loss is the strengthening by ex-
tension, albeit with modifications, of conventional social norms
regarding sexuality. As Kendall Thomas has pointed out, seg-
ments of the Lawrence opinion embody the heteronormative
impulses of a court struggling to position the gay men before it
as comparable to married persons, even though neither the re-
cord nor their attorneys suggested that John Lawrence and Ty-
ron Garner had anything other than a mutually desired
fleeting encounter.
175
Many lesbian and gay Americans want nothing as much as
they want the freedom to achieve precisely that kind of assimi-
lation, with the attendant protections and comfort that such
status carries. They are certainly correct to understand their
175. Kendall Thomas, Our Brown?: Reading Lawrence v. Texas (Jan. 4,
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478, 2481-82 (2003).
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exclusion from marriage and similar social institutions as evi-
dence of a breathtaking assertion of superiority by those who
would perpetuate the exclusion. But being allowed into the in-
stitution, and even changing it in the process, will not suffice as
freedom for those who object to organizing virtually all of a so-
ciety's laws regarding intimate adult relationships around mar-
riage.
The fact that Lawrence is consistent with this model of neo-
liberal civil rights does not mean, of course, that it is inherently
or necessarily limited in these ways. The adjudication of Law-
rence required no consideration of issues beyond the reach of
neoliberal equality; indeed the sweep of the Court's opinion was
surprising for its breadth, not its limits. It is simply important
not to overstate the zone of freedom that it establishes. The de-
cision leaves enormous flexibility as to how broadly or narrowly
future courts will interpret it. Perhaps the most significant
point to bear in mind is that the function of lower federal
courts, scholars, and practitioners now will be not so much to
find the meaning of Lawrence as to create it.
2004] 1139
